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THIS is a heavy book but it doesn’t weigh you down. If you think military history is cumbersome, this will change your mind.
Amarinder Singh went through the National Defence Academy and the Indian Military Academy before he was commissioned in 2 Sikh. At the special request of his father Maharaja Yadvindra Singh, his release from the Army was obtained in August, 1965, by Lieut-Gen Harbaksh Singh, Commander, Western Army.
War clouds appeared and Amarinder reported back to Harbaksh Singh, requesting permission to rejoin his unit. The General took him back as his ADC, from which position he would be able to see war from the highest level. Harbaksh Singh, who was a daring commander with deep insight, says in the foreword that this book is a consequence of that experience.
It impelled Amarinder, now the Congress President of Punjab, to research the significant battles fought by the Indian Army. Chosen by him are seven battles from three wars: the Kashmir war of 1947-48, the Indo-China war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.
Old soldiers, some now in their eighties, happily accompanied Amarinder Singh to the battle sites to reconstruct the events. Official versions tend to be staid and the unit accounts glorify events in the extreme.
With extensive interviews and group discussions recorded for posterity, the narrative in "Lest We Forget" promises you a high degree of objectivity. The reader is struck by that as he or she goes through the pages. The language is simple and takes you directly to the scene of action.
In weaving the battle account, the author paints the larger picture before leading you to the trenches. You are thus transported with comparative ease from the army commander’s perspective to the sound-bites of combat where bayonets and blood fail to flesh out the spirit of martyrs who are born in battle. Supplementing the text are elaborate maps, sketches and annotated coloured photographs.
Part One on the 1947-48 Kashmir war contains two crucial battles. The airlifting of 1 Sikh from Delhi to Srinagar where the unit could have dug in at the airfield. Instead, the commanding officer Lieut-Col Dewan Ranjit Rai chose to move further up to Baramula to save Srinagar and gain time for the build-up.
Well-trained in Burma where they held fire till they could see the whites of the Japanese eyes, the Sikhs now in skeletal strength took on the Pakistanis. Ranjit Rai was killed and was awarded a Maha Vir Chakra.
Throughout their Kashmir tenure, the Sikhs has a reputation that preceded them. In one battle the Sikhs suffered 121 casualties but killed 300 of the enemy.
Of those killed was Jemadar Nand Singh who had won a Victoria Cross in Burma. The Pakistanis recognised Nand Singh because of his VC ribbon. Shamefully, they took him to Muzaffarabad where his body was tied spreadeagled on a truck and paraded through the city with a loudspeaker proclaiming that this would be the fate of every Indian VC. This brave soldier’s body was later thrown into a garbage dump.
Contrast this with the Indian treatment of dead Pakistani soldiers. In 1971 Lieut-Col Mohammad Raza was killed while leading his troops in a desperate counter-attack. The Indians not only returned the body with full military honours but also handed with it a citation for gallantry in the name of their fallen commanding officer. Happily, that citation was honoured and Raza got a posthumous Nishan-e-Haider award of Pakistan.
Described next is the battle by Rajindra Sikhs (Patiala State Forces) to clear Zojila. After the second attempt had failed, Lieut-Gen Cariappa is reported to have said, "Change the name of the operation from Duct to Bison, but continue we must in our plan for Zojila and the capture of Kargil."
Making full use of the Patiala’s Dodge trucks with their winches, a single troop of Stuart tanks was got through in rain and slush to Zojila, at an altitude of 11,472 feet.
The sound of tanks made the enemy panic. Rajindra Sikhs intercepted a message from a Pakistani outpost commander to his headquarter which elicited the reply in explicit Punjabi that he must either be drunk or a coward.
Chapter Two describes two battles of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. That war is something we would like to forget, but cannot and mustnot. Despite the looming threat, when the question of India having to go to war with China was raised with the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon is recorded as having replied in his usual sarcastic style "... that there would be no war between India and China and, in the most unlikely event of there being one, he was quite capable of fighting it himself, on the diplomatic level."
Krishna Menon later prevailed over a series of spineless, sychophantic Generals to evict the Chinese from the north bank of Nam Ka Chu to "make an impact on the Chinese in NEFA before they settle down for winter."
"My God, they mean business," had been General Kaul’s startled reaction to the Chinese attack on the Indian lodgement across Nam Ka Chu. Later the Chinese mounted a full-scale offensive.
What followed was the heroic battle by 2 Rajput which fought to near extinction as part of Brig John Dalvi’s 7 Infantry Brigade holding untenable defences.
Described here is the story of valorous troops committed to undertake in impossible military task, operating at altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 16,000 feet in summer clothing without adequate weapons, ammunition, equipment and even rations.
In the Rezangla battle 13 Kumaon stemmed the Chinese offensive in Ladakh in November 1962. Cut off, Major Shaitan Singh and almost his entire company perished battling the Chinese who acknowledged their own highest casualties at Rezangla. Shaitan Singh got a posthumous Param Vir Chakra and the Chinese gave permission three months later to recover the dead, some of whose hands had to be prised open to extract live grenades ready to be lobbed.
Chapter Three contains three battles to give you a flavour of the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The spearheading of 3 Jat towards Dograi on the Amritsar-Lahore axis to relieve the pressure of the Pakistani offensive in Chhamb demonstrated the Jat spirit inspired by Lieut-Col Hayde, MVC.
The other two battles were pincers with a strategic aim. The attack by 2 Sikh on Raja picket in the Poonch sector to link-up with a northern thrust from Uri towards Haji Pir. Lieut-Col Khanna, MVC, was killed leading the valiant Sikhs from the front, and the battalion suffered massive casualties.
It was the daring of Major Ranjit Dayal, MVC, of 1 Para moving in from the north which put Haji Pir in our hands. Without food for 72 hours, his men made a semi-cooked meal out of a goat grazing nearby.
All through these battle of 1965 the leadership of the Army Commander Lieut-Gen Harbaksh Singh comes through clearly. He planned to eliminate the infiltration of guerrillas into J&K by taking the Haji Pir bowl in a classic pincer. This strategic bowl was later returned to Pakistan. With it also went forever India’s opportunity of linking Uri with Poonch.
We are a forgetful people, which is why "Lest We Forget" should be compulsory reading for all those concerned with national security. Even politicians.
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